THE CONTRIBUTION OF NIGERIA TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF AFRICAN AND GLOBAL PEACE AND THE RESOLUTION OF THE LIBERIA LONG-STANDING CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT
Africanized solutions were born as a result of the failure of western world to sustain stability and peace in African continent. Nigeria took up the task as Africa’s giant. Since the early 1990s, Nigeria has taken the helm of both international and regional peacekeeping initiatives. Nigeria makes up the fourth largest worldwide and the largest African contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. It is crucial to Nigeria's national interests to allow for sustained Nigerian participation of peacekeeping missions because Nigeria and the U.S. are a critical regional partner. This study discusses, among other things, Nigeria’s contribution to the peace effort in Liberia. Based on its findings, the paper makes the case that Nigeria’s participation in the Liberian peace process was primarily driven by the need to bring peace to the continent of Africa and the West Africa sub-region. This goal was attained, however, at a very high cost in terms of human and material resources. The article made the case that structural issues must be resolved in order to address the problem of conflicts in Africa.

Keyword: Conflict/War, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ECOWAS Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), Peace, Peacekeeping, Security

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1. INTRODUCTION
Since Nigeria became an independent nation in 1960, Africa has occupied a central position in her foreign policy (A zgaku, 2015). This is demonstrated by the significant human and material resources that various Nigerian governments have committed to pursuing this important foreign policy goal. Nigeria has attempted to manage inter-state relations and continued to be in the forefront of resolving conflicts not limited to West African sub-region through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and various bilateral agreements with its close neighbours. Nigeria having spearheading formation of ECOWAS with some member states in 1975 that desire a politically and/or economically stable and developing region. Based on the belief that regional integration and economic growth cannot be imposed on an unstable region (Onoja, 1996), Nigeria has made the promotion of peace and security the major focus in this regard.

Nigeria was the driving force behind the formation of the ECOWAS Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which made it easier to put an end to the civil hostilities and restore democracy in Sierra Leone and Liberia. Nigeria has a role in preventing and resolving conflicts beyond West African. Both within and outside of African continent, this was widely acknowledged. Sadly, these accomplishments have not put an end to political unrest and war in Africa. Instead, they appeared to have occurred at a time when conflicts were on the rise (Ugwu, 2008). Nigeria firmly believes that security and peace are
interdependent throughout the continent of Africa, as she declares that "a threat to peace anywhere in Africa is a threat to peace everywhere on the continent (Alli, 2012).” By extension, any African country at war or in trouble poses a threat to the stability of the entire world. Nigeria is committed to ending the crisis in Africa, as she believes that improved regional security as a result of economic and political stability, will bring the African region closer to political unification. The result of numerous peace initiatives presented by Nigeria to facilitate the resolution of the Darfur Crisis is the self-determination of Southern Sudan today as an independent sovereign state. Intense violence arose from Liberian civil war in December 1989 caused several civilian and military casualties (Kabia, 2009; Cleaver and May 1995). There was hence justification for international action, though the UN and the rest of the world were unwilling to intervene (Adebajo 2002). The responsibility was therefore placed on West African states, who Adebajo (2002) observed to be "most directly affected by refugee flows and other forms of instability resulting from conflicts" and are therefore "more inclined to act swiftly in such situations". As a result, in 1989, ECOWAS members from West African countries joined forces (though not unanimously) to launch an emergency security structure to end the crisis in Liberia.

In advancing peace in Liberia, an ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC) was entrusted which was proposed by Nigeria (Kabia, 2009). With her massive economic resources and her immense political and military prowess, Nigeria’s actions in West Africa can be significantly understood in light of her peacekeeping efforts in Liberia. In addition, Nigeria’s desire to become a regional power, however, is influenced by her general interest in West Africa. Nigeria therefore deserves praise for being the driving force behind the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, without which many more civilians would have lost their lives.

Aim of the Study
The main aim of the study is to appraise the Nigerian contributions to African and Global Peace, using Liberian conflict as a reference point.

Literature Review
This paper’s primary focus is on the concepts of conflict and peacekeeping. Conflict is a situation in which two or more opposing opinions or solutions are put out to address a specific issue. It is a violent manifestation of incompatibility or irreconcilability. Even if the two ideas overlap, the term "conflict" is used. Boulding (1962) as referenced by Osimen, Akinwunmi and Adetula (2015), conflict is viewed as a condition of competition when the parties are aware of the incompatibility of the prospective future position and each wants to occupy a position that is contrary to the wishes of the other. Coser (1956) sees conflict as “the struggle over values or claims of status, power, and scarce resources in which the goals of the group or individuals involved are not only to obtain the desired values, but to neutralise, injure, or eliminate rivals.” Peacekeeping is the act of a third party enforcing a ceasefire between opposing troops. This activity is typically taken in support of political efforts to reach a permanent peace agreement (Agwu, 2007). It entails the sending out of military, police, and frequently civilian troops to help implement agreement reached between opposing parties to a dispute. In its traditional context, peacekeeping referred to the process of containing a conflict and took the form of impartial assistance to mediate and persuade belligerent parties to disengage from the war (Dokubo, 2005). In this perspective, peacekeeping is a tactic that increases the potential for both conflict prevention and peacemaking. The concept of peacekeeping is however broad and encompasses many things, including human ideals and actions. The idea of peacekeeping is based on a few guiding principles, including the agreement of the conflicting parties, the restriction of the use of force to instances of self-defense, and most importantly claims of impartiality. Maintaining peacekeeping calls for a clear focus as well as suitable and well defined legislative framework to ensure better political sensitivity and susceptibilities, and for maintaining peace at the target nations (Azgaku, 2015).

Peacekeeping forces are defined by Demuren and Nikitin (1997) as civilian and military personnel chosen by the national governments of the nation taking part in the peace operation. According to Agwu (2007), peacekeeping mostly entails observer missions and lightly armed personnel operating with the consent of the parties involved. However, Evans (1993), emphasize that peacekeeping goes beyond using unarmed or lightly armed military contingents to oversee, monitor, and verify agreements pertaining to a cease-fire, a departure from the area, a better zone, and other related matters.

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2. RESEARCH METHOD
The work is historical nature that is qualitative method. Due to the nature of the work, it employs a chronological and thematic presentation of data. However, the reality is that the theme of Nigeria role in advancement of both Africa and global peace with specific role she played in bringing peace to the war torn Liberia affects different aspects of social relations and this has extensively examined in the study. This paper therefore draws insights from the approaches of related disciplines such as peace studies, security studies, international relations and host of discipline that have explored the subject matter conflict resolution. The work has employed secondary materials as its sources, which include archival materials, work of renowned scholars and view from the various discipline in the continents with extension to global scholars that deal with the issue of subject matter of the study.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
3.1. Commitment of Nigeria to the Economic Community of West African States and the Promotion of African peace
As the end of Cold War reduced the competition among the superpowers, the West African region became the host of some of the worst conflicts in history. The UN has limited its role and the scope of its peacemaking, even though the UN Security Council's primary duty under the UN Charter is to maintain international peace and security (Iweriebor and Uhomoibhi, 1999). A subsequent gap was developed as a result of the international organization's restricted function, especially given how conflicts have evolved. Furley and May (1998) state that:

"In years peacekeeping has been attempted in Africa, it has developed into extraordinary functionary. It is closely allied with peacemaking involving the political process of bringing the warring factions together, securing cease-fire and establishing peace talks and helping to negotiating peace accords".

Nigeria, which had a devastating civil war, oppressive rule by military and civilian administrations throughout the most of its post-independence history, has not been immune to the conflicts in Africa. However, it has remained steadfast in its commitment to Africa and beyond conflict prevention, resolution, and management. In addition to the previously mentioned elements, Nigeria's audacity for commitment to regional peace and security also arises from her tenacity and capacity for peacemaking in the African region and beyond. Aluko (1981) asserted that there is no question that her own strength has been the most significant contributor to Nigeria's more determined and optimistic stance in the continent's issues.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which Nigeria championed its creation in 1975, has stayed dedicated to it and, consequently, its monitoring group (ECOMOG), and this is considered in light of Nigeria's peacekeeping activities in the West African region (Salami, 2015). Today, there is little question that Nigeria played a key role in the formation of the ECOWAS Cease Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), which made it easier to resolve the crises in Sierra Leone and Liberia and eventually to restore democracy in those nations. Some of the member states, particularly Nigeria, wanted a politically and/or economically stable and developing region, which gave rise to the idea for ECOWAS (Salami, 2015). Nigeria sought ways to advance an eventual economic union in the West African region in the interim, and eventually to include OAU/AU member-states, in addition to advancing the objective of complete political independence for Africa with both financial and human resource support. Nigeria has also played a significant role in the majority of conflict mediation diplomacy and peace settlement agreements in almost all wars in West Africa by committing her considerable financial and military resources, particularly to the ECOWAS sponsored peacekeeping force in Liberia (Ebegbulem, 2012). She believes that economic growth and regional integration cannot be a trend in an insecure region, hence she has made promoting peace and security in Africa her key foreign policy goal. At a news conference in Lagos on October 31, 1990, General Babangida justified Nigeria intervention in the Liberia issue in response to detractors of the intervention. He said, among other things:

"Perhaps many do not yet realize the danger of international embarrassment the Liberian crisis portends for all of us in this region, to Africa and the black race in general, as well. Our critics tend to ignore the appalling human catastrophe which the Liberian crisis has created for us in this Sub-region, for the avoidance of doubt, neither Nigeria nor the members of the ECOMOG forced their way into the Liberian conflict in a manner resembling military adventurism. Nigeria is a member of the Sub regional group that took a solemn decision to restore peace by separating the warring factions in Liberia, which has been, without any legitimately constituted authority (Babangida, 1990).
Additionally, Salim Ahmed Salim, the former Secretary General of the OAU, supported the ECOWAS initiative by saying, "Africans are one people. Since another section of that people is suffering, it is unacceptable for one portion of that population to remain silent and appear helpless" (Akinterinwa, 2005). Nigeria's role as a peacekeeper, utilizing the AU and ECOMOG as tools, has made it feasible for many African countries to enjoy democracy and a degree of peace today. Nigeria was given credit for the mission because without the contribution of the majority of the troops, finances, and other military hardware, ECOMOG might not have been able to conduct any successful peacekeeping missions. Hutchful (1989) stated that "the ECOMOG operation could not have been sustained without Nigeria's massive contribution in funding and manpower." Nigeria has been reorganised as one of the largest contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping deployments, specifically the fifth-largest contributor of troops as of 2012/13, according to a ranking compiled by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations on a monthly basis (Afaha, 2016). The ranking of Nigeria in United Nations peacekeeping participation is shown in the table below.

Table 1: Top Ten Contributors of Military Troops and Police Personnel to UN Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Monthly</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>7,340</td>
<td>55,657</td>
<td>94,344</td>
<td>114,235</td>
<td>264,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>6,483</td>
<td>43,042</td>
<td>87,344</td>
<td>103,007</td>
<td>233,393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>4,071</td>
<td>33,929</td>
<td>36,902</td>
<td>75,708</td>
<td>146,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3,108</td>
<td>34,333</td>
<td>41,485</td>
<td>36,068</td>
<td>111,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>2,738</td>
<td>25,428</td>
<td>36,350</td>
<td>36,799</td>
<td>95,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>2,348</td>
<td>14,485</td>
<td>28,501</td>
<td>41,551</td>
<td>84,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,212</td>
<td>18,961</td>
<td>24,507</td>
<td>36,180</td>
<td>79,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>21,089</td>
<td>25,743</td>
<td>29,644</td>
<td>76,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2,012</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>30,315</td>
<td>41,041</td>
<td>72,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1,729</td>
<td>21,496</td>
<td>22,834</td>
<td>17,914</td>
<td>62,244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/7B65BF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3.PB.C

Nigeria’s efforts to sustain peace on the pursuit of domestic security through the promotion of peaceful relations between herself and her neighbours were supported by Kuna (1960). It might simply be the case that, in accordance with Adebayo (2004), Africans are starting to take care of their continent. Whatever the motivations behind Nigeria’s participation in ECOMOG's peacekeeping mission to Liberia, it is undeniable that Nigeria played a crucial role in ending the crisis in the country, which had the potential to spread to its neighbouring nations.

3.2. The Nigeria Dimension of the Liberia Peace Process

Francophone nations were among the majority of West African states that expressed their opposition to the Liberian peace process as a result of the ECOMOG force’s profile, which was dominated by Nigeria. Nigeria's major position in the sub-regional peace process, particularly in Liberia, may not be unprecedented by international relations standards because it is essential to such multinational operations that there be a lead country. For the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the US has continued to serve as its Supreme Commander due to her size, resources, and influence. In a similar vein, South Africa continues to be the region's natural power broker. As a result, it is not surprising that Nigeria, given its size and abundance of natural resources, is equally and understandably expected to lead the geopolitical zone's peace effort. Nigeria's commitment to ensuring the safety of people and property around the world since gaining independence in 1960 made it part of the country’s obligations as a UN member as well. As a result, Nigeria’s dominant position in ECOMOG operations emerged as a logical geopolitical development. This clarification shows that Nigeria’s involvement in the Liberia peace process through the ECOMOG apparatus was consistent with her foreign policy goals of advancing world peace. From a different angle, Nigeria's mission to Liberia had significant repercussions for the country and the sub-region. The government of Nigeria upholds the safety of Nigerians’ lives and property wherever in the world (Vogt, 1993). Nigerians were among the most numerous foreigners in Liberia at the time of the conflict. The Nigerian state had to rescue them as a result by evacuating them. Nigeria had a responsibility to prevent instability in the sub-region in the interest of the sub-region. The country’s concentric circles policy included, and still does, ensuring the security of the sub-region. It is a truth that Nigeria's position in the sub-region affords her the power to express interest in the wellbeing

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of the region. The nation controls 65% of the sub-region’s population, and she is a military force among her neighbours. More importantly, the Sub-region should not be in crisis as it affects Nigeria’s strategic interests because of the multiplier effect that might lead to insecurity that could spread to other parts of the region. The attendant impacts might include the emergence of dissident groups throughout the area and massive refugee problems, which could unavoidably put pressure on already tired (weak) infrastructure of host country and subsequently spark another round global crisis.

Nigeria’s indigenous solution to the Liberian conflict was a result of her background in international diplomacy. Nigeria has always made sincere efforts to serve as a peacemaker in conflict-ridden regions of Africa. Therefore, when the Liberian crisis arose, Nigeria’s position was that extra-regional powers would intervene if the sub-regional leaders did not act swiftly and decisively as well, giving them the chance to infiltrate other states in the sub-region and subsequently undermine their security. On May 30, 1990, at the thirteenth summit meeting of the ECOWAS Heads of State in Banjul, Gambia, amid the willful destruction of lives and property in Liberia, Nigeria proposed the creation of an ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC) to look into the disruptive conflicts and disputes (Official Journal of ECOWAS, 1990; Vogt, 1993). Nigeria’s position on the proposed ESMC was clear given that the international community was preoccupied elsewhere and that the security situation in Liberia was at its worst, resulting in the loss of lives and properties. The argument put forward by Nigeria was persuasive enough for the Authority of ECOWAS to hold its first Extraordinary Summit meeting in November to examine the debacle in Liberia. The necessity to provide the organization and its Secretariat greater initiative in tackling challenging situations without calling a meeting of all Heads of government served as the general inspiration for the creation of an ESMC (Vogt, 1993). As a result, the ESMC was created, with Nigeria, Togo, Gambia, Ghana, and Mali as founding members, with the possibility to extend membership for additional terms of three years. ESMC moved forward to take command of the issue in response to the urgency and in accordance with the terms of the 1981 Freetown-signed ECOWAS Mutual Defense Treaty. The committee however extended hand of cooperation to all interest groups in the conflict from the beginning.

The funding of ECOWAS activities in Liberia was the ESMC decision that proved to be the most challenging to put into action. Some ECOWAS nations, including Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, and some other Francophone nations, openly expressed their displeasure with the formation of ECOMOG. Other nations, however, who sympathised with and supported the ECOMOG initiative’s goal of promoting peace in Liberia, lacked the financial wherewithal to fully support the mission. With this scenario, it became immediately apparent that Nigeria bore a significant portion of the responsibility for restoring peace to troubled Liberia in terms of both people, material, and financial resources. Of the 6,000 soldiers dispatched to Liberia, Nigeria had provided 5,000 by October 1990 (83.3%) of them. When the number of ECOMOG personnel increased to 12,000 between 1991 and 1993, 10,000 (83%) of the total contributions came from Nigeria alone (Salami, 2015). Togo and Mali, two nations who were intended to send troops to the force, withdrew from the agreement, for the reasons best known to them. Nigerian commanders predominated the force’s command positions in addition to having the most troops during ECOMOG operations in Liberia (Aboagye, 1999). It is sufficient to remember that only Lt. General Arnold Quainoo, the force’s first Field Commander (FC), was not a Nigerian between 1990 and 1996. The leadership and staff at the group’s tactical and artillery task brigade headquarters were wholly Nigerian (Aboagye, 1999). The table below demonstrates how the ECOMOG Force Command was dominated by Nigerian officers.

Table 2: ECOMOG Force Commanders as Dominated by Nigerian Officers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>Lt. Gen</td>
<td>Arnold Quainoo</td>
<td>Freetown/Monrovia</td>
<td>August – Sept. 1990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: F.B. Aboagye (1999)
Nigeria spent resources and personnel on the Liberian military battles that were successful. The war claimed the lives of several Nigerian soldiers, journalists, and other Nigerians living in Liberia (Nwabulkwe, 1999). Approximately 6,000 Liberian refugees were also hosted by Nigeria, which had social repercussions on the host village of Oru-Ijebu in the Ijebu-North Local Government Area of Ogun State in southwest Nigeria. Nigeria participated extremely actively and visibly in all of the peace negotiations for Liberia on a diplomatic level. The nation presided over and hosted a few of the peace negotiations between 1990 and 1993 (Official Journal of ECOWAS, 1990; Vogt, 1993). Nigeria made enormous material sacrifices to restore peace to Liberia. The majority of the military equipment and accompanying support services were supplied by her. In actuality, President Obasanjo made it public in 1999, the amount spent and the number of Nigerian soldiers who paid the ultimate price. He estimated that Nigeria spent roughly $8 billion estimated to be between #759 and #800 billion. Thousands officers and troops Nigerian military lost their lives in the Liberian crisis. Thousands Nigeria were injured, many were permanently disabled, in addition to the deceased (Salami, 2015).

3.3. The Constraints of Nigeria in the Liberia Crisis
The operation in Liberia under Nigeria leadership was successful, but not without some challenges. A review of these limitations is aimed to act as a wake-up call (lesson) for future operations rather than to discredit the entire operation. Indeed, one of the main responsibilities of ECOMOG was to oversee a total ceasefire and prevent the loss of life and property. Few among the identified challenges are highlighted below:

a. A ceasefire had not been reached before ECOMOG forces arrived in the Freeport of Liberia, hence there was no ceasefire to observe. The erring groups were still choking each other. In fact, Taylor’s NPFL launched vicious assaults to welcome the international forces into Liberia (Iweze, 1993).

b. This challenge was made even worse which was due to absence of Force Headquarters (FHQ). When ECOMOG landed in Liberia, the FHQ was not legitimately operational. Additionally, the allied forces lacked sufficient intelligence reports on the state of affairs in Liberia. The collection of intelligence reports would have benefited greatly from the presence of military maps of Liberia (Iweze, 1993). The mood and attitude of the troops toward the entire operation were impacted by these developments. The FHQ is the center of peacekeeping operations and should be the first to be established in order to welcome the troops and inform them of the situation on the ground, but this is lacking.

c. Many ECOWAS nations had the impression that Nigeria was attempting to take control of the sub-region. As a result, the policies that the ECOWAS wished to pursue were met with disagreement, aware of and tired of Nigeria’s rising strength. The majority of French-speaking countries in West Africa, especially Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, were averse to follow Nigeria’s lead (Adebajo 2002). As a result, the ECOWAS member states’ support for the peacekeeping mission was divided as a result of their perceptions of Nigeria’s objectives.

d. Nigeria’s involvement further made things worse because Charles Taylor and his NPFL did not trust Nigeria’s leadership of the operation. They believed that Nigeria’s attempts to intervene in the conflict were motivated by its desire to dominate West Africa and to assist the defunct Doe government. Despite promises to maintain impartiality made at the 1990 ECOWAS summit, ECOMOG was not seen as neutral and legitimate in this sense (Cleaver and May, 1995).

e. Nigeria was primarily responsible for carrying out the operation because the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia was severely compromised by poor logistical support. With the exception of Nigeria, the nations that provided troops (Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana, and Gambia) could not afford transportation logistics, such as trucks for moving people between locations. As the only nation capable of airlifting or ferrying troops from one location to another, this placed a significant burden on Nigeria. Many of ECOMOG’s initiatives were slowed down by these challenges, which had negative results.

f. In addition to having major leadership issues, the initial high command of the ECOMOG troops also displayed indifference among the forces’ rank and file. The actions of the first Field Commander (FC), Lt. Gen. Arnold Quainoo, during the brief time he was in charge, did not improve the situation. He became careless in his duties by giving Prince Johnson of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) free entry into the FHQ, which ultimately opened the door for the capture of Samuel Doe. This was in addition to his incapacity to make strong choices impacting the operations of the forces. As an impartial arbitrator, ECOMOG had credibility issues. (Iweze, 1993).
g. An impartial arbiter would have orchestrated a rescue operation to save Samuel Doe. However, this was not to be as the FC himself fled for safety, temporarily moving his office to the ECOMOG warship. This had a demoralizing effect on the troops because only Nigerian soldiers were left at the FHQ by the Sierra Leonean and Ghanaian soldiers for the ship (Iweze, 1993). It is instructive to note that inexperienced commanders, especially those who have never participated in peacekeeping missions, should under no circumstances be permitted to hold the position of highest ranking officer within the allied forces.

h. In addition, inconsistent flow of finances also affected the ECOMOG operations in Liberia. The ECOWAS Secretariat initially relied on the countries that provided the troops to take care of their contingents, which led to various financial and associated crises. This issue became evident when each contingent used up its initial supplies and the ECOWAS Secretariat was unable to raise money to assist the forces right once. The $3 daily military allowance was far too little for soldiers who would fight and suffer injuries or fatalities. The payment was also not as consistent as it ought to be, even when the allowance was raised to $5 per day (Iweze, 1993). Hence, the needs of the troops were not being met in a sufficient manner. These flaws damaged the soldiers’ morale as a combat force that needed to be well-cared for.

i. Nigeria also had to deal with the perception of corruption in the payment of Nigerian military personnel sent to support peacekeeping missions. The UN reimburses governments sponsoring these missions based on a stipend per member and item of equipment actually deployed in order to encourage African nations to fund peacekeeping operations (United Nations, 2012). The military believes that Nigerian authorities are skimming these funds, which reduced the reimbursement to the military establishment and underpays the servicemen taking part in peacekeeping operations (El-Rufai, 2012).

j. In 2008, Nigerian troops protesting what they believed to be pay skimming converged on the Nigerian town of Akure, the capital of the Ondo State, upon their return from peacekeeping missions in Liberia. They were only given $3,000 from the Nigerian government, as opposed to $7,368 per soldier total for the six-month deployment based on the UN’s stated stipend of $1,228 per soldier per month (HUNUADMIN, 2012).

3.4. Benefits to Nigeria of Supporting and Participating in Peacekeeping Operations

While the 2011 peacekeeping conference emphasized several difficulties, it also listed a number of benefits. According to Eno-Abassi (2011), Colonel Adewale Adeniyi Taiwo observed that Nigeria had benefited from its consistent support in a number of areas:

a. Nigeria has received improved training and support from the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, as well as through bilateral and multilateral training events. ACOTA, administered through the U.S. Department of State, and the other military activities are designed to increase military peacekeeping capabilities.

b. The UN Troop Contributing Country (TCC) financial compensation program was another highlighted economic benefit. The Nigerian government received compensation from the UN through this program for “raising, training, and sustaining” her deployed peacekeeping personnel. Foreign military funding was increased, including $66 million from the U.S. in 2000.

c. Nigeria’s international influence has increased as a result of its regional leadership, as evidenced by the U.N. Security Council’s admission of Nigeria as a non-permanent member.

d. Nigeria’s role in UN peacekeeping has also developed very professional military commanders. Since its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations beginning from 1960, Nigeria has had 25 of its general officers selected for duties as Peace Support Operations (PSO) Force Commanders.

e. Additionally, Nigerian peacekeepers and their leadership won high praise for their assistance in international missions like UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia in 1992. Nigerians currently hold important leadership roles in the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

f. Nigeria has become a major international player in representing African matters due to its shown leadership. Assignment to significant positions within the UN leadership system is another political dividend Nigeria reaped for its constant leadership role in peacekeeping activities. For instance, Professor Ibrahim Gambari and Ambassador Olu Adeniji, subsequently the Nigerian Foreign Minister respectively served as the Special Representative for the Secretary General (SRSG) for the missions in Angola and Darfur, and Central African Republic and Sierra Leone (Adebayo, 2004).
g. Potential permanent membership of UN Security Council. Since 1966, Nigeria has participated in the UN Security Council four times as a non-permanent member. For Nigeria, holding these kinds of positions translates into international prestige. Muhammad Juma Kuna emphasized on this that “Nigeria is particularly suited to represent Africans both domestically and internationally due to its consistent work in regional peacekeeping” (Kuna, 2005).

4. CONCLUSION

The study has revealed significant contributions made by Nigeria to the resolution of regional and sub-regional conflicts, as well as conflicts outside of Africa. The paper has established to have cost the nation billions of dollars and heroic members of the Nigerian Armed Forces who have made the ultimate sacrifice for the sake of peace. In appreciating Nigeria efforts, the UN, OAU/AU, and the West African sub-regional organization should collaborate to address the underlying causes and effects of these crises in the global community and propose cooperative and practical solutions. The study came to the conclusion that the Nigerian has demonstrated that she is not only a significant player within the West African sub-region but also fulfills duties as a regional and global leader. These stances, as well as the dedication behind them, have been more firmly stated in the defense of West Africa. Nigeria has shown that she is willing, capable, and dedicated to preserving peace throughout Africa. She has also shown her dedication to promoting social, economic, political and diplomatic integration in West Africa and beyond. Some of these suggestions are institutional adjustments that would encourage new arrangement and frameworks for stability and peace in the West African sub-region. This includes, but is not limited to:

1. It is recommended that every country must first ensure its survival before pursuing other objectives abroad, a portion of the funds used for peacekeeping missions should go toward maintaining internal security.
2. Despite Nigeria’s outstanding efforts, the OAU/AU and the sub-regional organizations need to do more to address the underlying causes and effects of conflicts throughout Africa.
3. There should be increased use of diplomacy and related non-coercive conflict settlement techniques. Instead of using force to resolve disputes, consultation, mediation, and communication should be encouraged.
4. The administration and equipment of peacekeeping forces should be sufficient for the successful enforcement of diplomatic, economic, and arms and ammunition embargoes.
5. An office of a Special Representative should be established in the field to provide political direction to the Field Commander (FC). FCs should be answerable to the Authority through the Executive Secretary and not to force contributing states.
6. Selection process for peacekeeping mission should be done based on merit and competence to ensure optimum result. A military staff committee should be instituted within the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS.
7. Since ECOWAS was able to change and broaden its mandate through the Liberian experiment to include managing, resolving, and preventing conflicts, ECOMOG should be kept as an example for the rest of Africa to follow as an intervention force to address instability on the continent.

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